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Preface 
 
The following paper is a key note address presented by Kathleen B. 
Jones at FREIA’s annual conference 2005  – “Power and identities in a 
globalized world”, at Aalborg University, Saturday the 16th of April 
2005. 
Kathleen B. Jones is professor of Women’s Studies at San Diego State 
University. 
 
Birte Siim 
Katleen B. Jones 
Reflections on Violence and Gender in an Era of 
Gloalization: A Philosophical Journey with Hannah 
Arendt 
 
These remarks are drawn from a work in progress, a book I am writing 
about the influence of Hannah Arendt’s life and work in my own. 
Tentatively titled Diving for Pearls: A Thinking Woman’s Journey, this 
work marks a departure from my more traditional academic work and 
takes a personal approach to philosophical themes.  
 
The paper I present today is an extended meditation on two excerpts 
from Hannah Arendt’s 1964 essay, “Personal Responsibility Under 
Dictatorship.” These excerpts are: 
 
“There exists in our society widespread fear of 
judging…[B]ehind the unwillingness to judge lurks the 
suspicion that no one is a free agent, and hence doubt that 
anyone is responsible or could be expected to answer for what 
he has done…” 
“…who has ever maintained that by judging a wrong I 
presuppose that I myself would be incapable of committing it?” 
1 
 
These quotations form the horizon of my lecture, which aims to mimic 
the thinking process itself. I will take a journey with Hannah Arendt as 
my guiding thinker so as to get inside, as it were, the process of 
thought… 
 
 
Exactly thirty years ago, Hannah Arendt came to Denmark to receive the 
Sonning Prize for her contributions to European civilization. The April 
1975 ceremony in Copenhagen was, for Arendt, an occasion of great 
honor and great embarrassment. She was not someone who took public 
recognition well, perhaps partly because her political writings had made 
her, more than once, a person for whom recognition bordered on infamy. 
In her award speech, Arendt alluded to the “conflicting reactions and 
                                                 
1. Responsibility and Judgment, (Schocken Books, 2003), 19. 
 
reflections” with which she was struggling to come to terms ever since 
she received “the startling news” of having been selected for the prize, 
and recounted these for her audience. Uncharacteristically, Arendt began 
“with the purely biographical.” 2 
 
“It is no small matter to be recognized for a contribution to European 
civilization for somebody who left Europe thirty-five years ago by no 
means voluntarily—and then became a citizen of the United States, 
entirely and consciously voluntarily…I am, as you know, a Jew, femini 
generis, as you can see, born and educated in Germany, and formed to a 
great extent by eight long and rather happy years in France. I don’t know 
what I contributed to European civilization,” she continued, “but I do 
admit that I clung throughout all these years to this European background 
in all its details and with great tenacity.” Even though she became an 
American in the political sense, she confessed that she “had never wished 
to belong, not even in Germany…” 3 
Because she didn’t want to belong to Europe, except in terms of the 
language, and couldn’t see exactly what she had contributed to European 
civilization, she was inclined to refuse the award, but for another conflict 
with which the award confronted her because it was Danish: 
 
I have always been fascinated by the particular way the Danish 
people and their government handled and solved the highly 
explosive problems posed by the Nazi conquest of 
Europe…This episode of your history offers a highly 
instructive example of the great power potential inherent in 
nonviolent action and in resistance to an opponent possessing 
vastly superior means of violence…[W]hile there were a few 
countries in Nazi-occupied Europe which succeeded by hook 
or by crook in saving most of their Jews, I think the Danes 
were the only ones who dared speak out on the subject to their 
masters. And the result was that under pressure of public 
opinion, and threatened neither by armed resistance nor by 
guerilla tactics, the German officials in the country changed 
their minds…they were overpowered by…mere words, spoken 
freely and publicly.4 
 
                                                 
2. “Prologue,” Responsibility and Judgment, 3. 
3. Ibid. 3-4 
In a sense, Arendt was indicating that part of her motivation to accept 
was the chance it offered her to honor the honorers, to thank them for 
helping to prevent Jews, like her, from being wiped off the face of the 
earth. (It is no small irony that the recent news of Danish complicity 
with the deportation of Jews to Germany and the research of Kirsten 
Lylloff of the University of Copenhagen about the post- World War II 
starvation of some 10,000 German children who were refugees in 
Denmark complicates Arendt’s depiction of Danish resistance). Had 
this been enough to consider, Arendt might have overcome her self-
doubt and immediately said “yes” to the prize. But she didn’t. She 
hesitated because, as she told her friend Mary McCarthy, and later the 
audience in Copenhagen, “by personal temperament and 
inclination…” she tended to “shy away from the public realm.”5 
Perhaps this shyness sounded strange, Arendt admitted, to those who 
had read her books, finding there her “praise, perhaps even 
glorification, of the pubic realm…as the proper space of appearances 
for political speech and action.” But, she added,  
 
“[I]n matters of theory and understanding it is not uncommon 
for outsiders and mere spectators to gain a sharper and deeper 
insight into the actual meaning of what happens to go on before 
or around them than would be possible for the actual actors and 
participants, who are entirely absorbed, as they must be, by the 
events themselves…” 6 
 
Arendt said she preferred secrecy and anonymity not only because she 
was naturally inclined in that direction, but also because her decision to 
study philosophy, which supported solitude, was reinforced by the 
“antipublic climate” of the 1920s, the era of her coming of age, which 
made one run from public recognition because, at the time, it reeked of 
the inauthenticity of publicity in a mass society that decried all 
distinctions, except the “radiant power of fame.”  
 
The publicity of the prize set off in her what Arendt, somewhat 
humorously, called a “`crisis of identity.´”7 Mentioning how worried 
Socrates was that the gods were up to some trickery when the Delphic 
                                                                                                                                               
4. Ibid., 5-6. 
5. Ibid., 7-8. 
6. Ibid., 8. 
7. Ibid., 11. 
oracle announced him the wisest of men, Arendt asked, “what could the 
gods have meant by making you select for public honor somebody like 
me, who is neither a public figure nor has the ambition to become one.” 
What was she supposed to understand about this event? The answer she 
came to was this—the prize was a persona, a role the world had invited 
her to play. Like wearing the Roman mask to which the word persona 
referred, it was a way to appear “in a society where we were not citizens, 
that is, not equalized by the public space established and reserved for 
political speech and political acts, but where we are accepted as 
individuals in our own right…”8 
 
It was as if the prize created a moment when Hannah Arendt--Jew, 
woman, outsider--could appear as an individual in her own right (having 
civil standing) in a place where she did not belong politically (Denmark), 
from which she had been both driven out as a Jew and exiled herself, but 
to which she clung (Europe, the German language), without having to 
negate any one of these dimensions of who she was (her naked 
‘thisness’). Taking the mask the world had offered her, she appeared as if 
between public and private, between past and future, and said she was 
honored and thankful for the moment. She accepted the award and opted 
to remain a “conscious pariah.” 
 
That Arendt took this occasion to talk about herself in public is, I think, 
instructive. Wearing the persona of honoree, Arendt told her audience 
personal things about herself without violating her own sense of privacy. 
And what she revealed was not simply the few biographical facts she 
recounted, but the fact that she deliberately had shied away from the 
public realm of action in order to sharpen her insights into what was “the 
actual meaning of what happen[ed] to go on before or around [her].” 
What happened around her, the “event” she spent her life’s work trying 
to understand, was totalitarianism and the extreme terror and violence of 
the death camps that became its horrifying trademark.   
 
Yet, the fact was, Arendt was not only a spectator; she was also a 
participant, implicated directly in the events happening around her. Not 
only had she been arrested in Germany and interred in France and been 
declared a “stateless person,” she also had been involved actively in the 
study of Zionism in the late 1920s and early 1930s and defended a non-
                                                 
8. Ibid., 13. 
nationalist version of Zionism into the 1940s. What then did she mean 
when she said she had chosen the position of outsider?  
 
In several essays, but most clearly in an essay called “The Jew as 
Pariah,” Arendt explained what she meant. The pariah was an outcast, 
someone made so by definition, that is, because of some “unchosen, 
historically given membership in an outcast group.”9 The “conscious 
pariah” chose to take up that position, refused to erase herself and 
insisted “on telling the truth, even to the point of ‘indecency.’”10 By 
positioning herself outside of events in which she was also a participant, 
Arendt became a spectator. By creating a distance between herself as a 
thinker and herself as she was, she became able to make judgments even 
about things with which she was intimately connected. It was this 
“outsider’s” position that allowed her to develop an ethical perspective, 
which she called, following Kant, thinking with an “enlarged mentality.”  
 
Arendt wrote powerful and disturbing essays about personal and 
collective responsibility for violence. I think her monumental work on 
violence is more germane than ever in the world in which we live—a 
world wracked by fear and terror and violence. And even though Arendt 
had little to say about the problematics of gender and violence, I consider 
what she said about personal and collective responsibility especially 
telling in connection with efforts to make feminist sense of the 
relationship between gender and violence, by which I mean both the 
pandemic of violence against women and the equally chilling images that 
came out of Rwanda, and, most recently, out of Abu Ghraib, images that 
have forced us to remember that violence can also wear a female face. 
Or, as the American social critic Barbara Ehreneich said last year, 
“Women can do the unthinkable.”11 
 
Of course, women can. It shouldn’t have taken Abu Ghraib to remind us 
of that. But this graphic example provides an occasion not only to 
consider that, as Ehrenreich put it, only a naïve kind of feminism could 
continue to see  “men as perpetual perpetrators, women as perpetual 
victims, and make sexual violence against women as the root of all 
injustice,”12 but also how to think differently about the whole problem of 
                                                 
9. Bat-Ami Bar On, The Subject of Violence, 22. 
10. Arendt, “We Refugees,” Menorah Journal (1943), 31:77. 
11. “What Abu Ghraib Taught Me,” http://www.altnet.org/story/18740 
12. Ibid. 
gender and violence. I think Hannah Arendt helps us “think differently” 
about the subject of violence. 
 
In a series of essays she wrote in the m id-196os, Arendt aimed to 
distinguish between personal and collective responsibility. Personal 
responsibility meant responsibility for what one actually did and, in the 
legal arena, was connected to the question of guilt for one’s misdeeds 
and crimes. Collective responsibility was the responsibility an individual 
assumed for something he or she did not do, but took on because he or 
she was a member of a group (a collective), which no voluntary act could 
dissolve. Or , to put it differently, collective responsibility is “vicarious 
responsibility for things we have not done…taking upon ourselves the 
consequence for things we are entirely innocent of…[as] the price we 
pay for the fact that we live our lives not by ourselves, but among our 
fellow men.” 13 
 
Several interesting feminist questions emerge from these distinctions, 
questions which I pose, but do not fully answer: 
 
 
 
1) How far should the notion of “collective” or group be stretched? If 
a racist or sexist or heterosexist system creates a group whose 
members benefit automatically from the socio-political system so 
constituted, does that group bear collective responsibility for the 
damage done in its name? In other words, are men, as a group, 
responsible for actions against women even if they personally do 
not participate? Are whites or whatever racial/ethnic group is 
dominant responsible for racist damage? Heterosexuals for 
heterosexism? 
 
2) How does the fact that patriarchal, racist, and   because of some 
“unchosen, historically given membership in an outcast privilege 
are natters of national law and not only custom complicate the 
matter of collective responsibility? Does this implicate (hold 
collectively responsible) both those who benefit and those who 
lose in such systems, since both “winners” and “losers” are 
members of the same national collectivity? 
                                                 
13. “Collective Responsibility,” in Responsibility and Judgment, op.cit., 157-8. 
 
3) If one can never escape collective responsibility for actions which 
one did not do, but which were done in one’s name, why is the 
concept of personal responsibility also still important for feminist 
thought? Collective responsibility connects to the concept of the 
“privilege” one enjoys simply by virtue of being a member of a 
privileged group. Does the concept of personal responsibility, 
which depends upon the activities of thinking and judging, provide 
the needed distance to question supporting the system that creates 
the privilege?  
 
4) And how far goes the concept of collective responsibility get 
stretched in the context of globalization? Globalization has 
complicated matters of collective responsibility. The rape of young 
women by UN soldiers, the torture of prisoners in Abu Ghraib 
(Iraq) in the name of the alliance against Saddam Hussein (of 
which Denmark is a part), and the subjection of women to the risk 
of AIDS in South Africa through unprotected sex in the context of 
inadequate medical care and expensive drug treatment are only 
three examples of the dilemmas surrounding how wide to cast the 
net of collective responsibility for different dimensions of the 
problem of gender and violence. 
 
Hovering in the background of her Copenhagen remarks is Arendt’s most 
controversial “public” work, the one that had caused her perhaps the 
greatest pain --Eichmann in Jerusalem.  Considering what she wrote in 
Eichmann will help us approach the question of collective responsibility 
for violence in ways that will bring the issue closer to home. 
 
In 1960, when Arendt heard that Nazi deportation commander Adolf 
Eichmann had been arrested in Buenos Aires by Israeli agents she wrote 
immediately to William Shawn, the editor of The New Yorker, to propose 
herself as a trial correspondent. Shawn, who knew Arendt’s reputation 
for boldness, jumped at the offer and in the early months of 1961 Arendt 
began planning her trip to Jerusalem.  Finally, she wrote in a letter, she 
would get to see those people in the flesh. 
 
A haunting meditation on morality written about what Arendt saw and 
read during and after the trial, reading Eichmann remains deeply 
disturbing. Over the report hangs the shadow of Arendt’s complicated 
judgment which she summarized in the unfortunate phrase, “the banality 
of evil.”  
 
Despite her opinion that when the Israelis seized Eichmann they acted 
outside international law, Arendt concluded that the Jerusalem court had 
jurisdiction and was correct to condemn him. She disagreed with the 
court’s rationale and in a polemical and high-minded epilogue even had 
the nerve to tell the judges that justice would have been served better had 
they addressed the condemned with the words she wrote instead of their 
own, explaining to Eichmann that because he did not want to share the 
earth with the Jewish people, no member of the human race would now 
want to share it with him. But the most disturbing, scandalous 
conclusions she reached were about Eichmann himself. 
 
Eichmann, Hannah Arendt said, seemed to be more a clown than a 
monster. He wasn’t evil, he was “thoughtless,” unable to reflect on the 
fact that what he was doing was wrong. Someone once suggested to him, 
Why not join the S.S, to which he replied, Why not? As if he believed he 
were a “leaf in the whirlwind of time,” Eichmann became unable to 
distinguish between sending people to their deaths and doing his job. 
And the real trouble wasn’t Eichmann but how many others were like 
him--terrifying normal, their evil banal. What had happened, she 
wondered, to make so many people like him? 
 
Arendt thought she already had answered that question in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, a book she’d written a decade before Eichmann. But 
confronting Eichmann in the flesh changed her answer. Listening both to 
his testimony and the witnesses called by the prosecution, Arendt became 
convinced that “extermination would not have come to an end when no 
Jew was left to be killed” because killing itself was the point of the 
matter. Far too many people were unable to think that the practice of evil 
became ordinary. “From the accumulated evidence one can only 
conclude that conscience as such had apparently got lost in Germany.” 
 
Arendt pulled no punches. She judged even members of the Jewish 
Council responsible, citing records documenting how Jewish officials 
cooperated with the Nazis by providing lists of those to be deported. 
“Without Jewish help in administration and police work…there would 
have been either complete chaos or an impossibly severe drain on 
German manpower…To a Jew this role of the Jewish leaders in the 
destruction of their own people is undoubtedly the darkest chapter of the 
whole dark story.”  
 
The banality of evil? Jews guilty? The darkest chapter? These ideas were 
preposterous, many concluded. She may be Jewish, her critics said, but 
she certainly was soulless; perhaps she was one of those self-hating anti-
Semitics. The year Eichmann was published the Anti-Defamation 
League sent out a circular to all rabbis to preach against her on Rosh 
Hashannah. To this Hannah Arendt responded in a letter to her friend, the 
author Mary McCarthy, “What a risky business to tell the truth on a 
factual level without theoretical and scholarly embroidery.” The why had 
she taken the risk? And what had it cost her? 
The fallout from Eichmann continued for years and during most of it 
Hannah Arendt remained silent, waiting years to write an essay, “Truth 
and Politics,” in which, obliquely, she responded to her attackers. Yet, 
she wrote in another letter to Mary McCarthy, though critics’ barbs 
wounded her, she thought writing Eichmann had been curiously 
cathartic; writing it cured her of emotional attachments she thought had 
clouded her judgment of her own past.  
 
When I read that letter to McCarthy I wondered what Arendt could have 
meant by saying that writing Eichmann made her feel “light-hearted.” 
What emotions had she thought clouded her judgment? And did she 
really believe she’d discarded those ghostly attachments? At the time, I 
didn’t want to believe her. I’m not sure I want to believe her now. And 
yet, I’ve come to think Eichmann carries much significance for 
understanding questions of personal and collective responsibility for 
violence in our dark times.  
 
Arendt wrote Eichmann through what she described in another context as 
a “fearful imagination,”14 it was as if Arendt brought herself face to face 
with a test case of her own earlier, more theoretical arguments. And she 
allowed the event to force her to abandon any simple way to think herself 
out of the situation. Arendt took what was perhaps too close to her and 
put it at a distance, at the same time as she brought what seemed remote 
from her closer.  And to explain why I think this is important and why I 
think it is so powerful a way past the dichotomies about gender and 
                                                 
14. “The Concentration Camps,” Partisan Review, (1948), 15: 746. 
violence that Barbara Ehrenreich called naive, I have to tell you a more 
personal story. 
 
For a long time I wanted to write a book about Hannah Arendt and, in 
1994, when the chance came along in the middle of my life, I grabbed it. 
It never occurred to me I was about to embark on a strange journey. In 
those days, I thought I had all the tools I needed. I understood the 
methods of historical and textual analysis and with my mind’s eye read 
Arendt’s books and the essential Arendtian commentary. But that eye can 
be a deceiver, blind to the surfaces, probing only for depth.  
 
I moved across The Origins of Totalitarianism to The Human Condition 
and The Life of the Mind and taking in the collections of essays—
Between Past and Future, On Violence, Men in Dark Times—I lost 
myself in thinking about Hannah Arendt. For no apparent reason, I saved 
Eichmann in Jerusalem for last.  
I was reading Eichmann in October when my father took a turn for the 
worse. He’d been battling colon cancer for five years. Now he was 
dying, ending my daughterhood and losing that, perhaps even more than 
losing him, made me deeply afraid. 
 
A punctilious, judgmental man with a drinker’s obsession, he lived in 
Brooklyn his whole life, largely absent from mine, looming in it. As a 
young man he played trumpet and took me with him every Sunday to the 
Knights of Columbus Hall to watch the marching band until my mother’s 
impatience with unsurprising rhythms frustrated his hobby and our 
outings. Except for the occasional trip to Manhattan to see the model 
train show I don’t remember Dad and I doing anything special again until 
after my parents divorced and on his weekly visits we went to the 
movies.  
 
My erratic, high-heeled, sexy mother was a gambling kind of drinker and 
wouldn’t settle for the predictability of a John Phillip Sousa when she 
could have the velvet-tongue of a Mel Torme or the twangy seduction of 
a Hank Williams. Mom was a sucker for melodrama, for movies where 
Jimmy Cagney played the repentant mobster or Susan Hayward, another 
redhead, shouted "I don't need you, I don't want you, you go find some 
scared little girl and tell her what a big, brave man you are." Dad took 
pleasure retreating from such histrionics into his model car collection or 
lining up the family shoes in the kitchen on Saturday and polishing them 
for hours. We had the best-shined shoes in Mill Basin. Their marriage 
lasted ten years until I was nine and the attraction to out-doing each 
other’s bad habits approached lethal.  
 
Drinking was the one real thing my parents had in common and over 
time it became a kind of binding anti-bond, something that kept them 
together in their apartness. When they drank, they fought more, and more 
violently. On the surface, their fights were about money and sex and, in 
the early days, about having to live with my grandparents. But 
drunkenness glossed a deeper fury each must have felt at being tied to the 
other, bound to have and to hold forever the one person least likely to 
last.  
 
For the first seven years of my life my parents and I lived together with 
my maternal grandparents in a brick house in Mill Basin. The 
arrangement ended when grandparents decided they wanted their own 
apartment and my parents couldn’t afford the house on their own. After 
Dad left, Mom and I stayed in the apartment the three of us had moved 
to. That’s when Mom started dating the policeman whose wife hung 
around our block one day waiting for my mother to get home from work 
just so she could call her 'whore' to her face.  
 
"Do you know what your mother is, little girl?" she asked me one day as 
I walked home from fourth grade in my Mary Queen of Heaven school 
uniform.  
"Of course," I said, attempting to cut her of at the pass, "she's an operator 
at the Telephone Company." 
"I don’t mean what she does for a living. I mean what she is. She's a 
whore. She's a thief. She's trying to steal my husband and my little girl's 
Daddy. Would you like that, little girl? Would you like it if someone was 
trying to steal your Daddy?" 
"My Daddy doesn't live here anymore," I said, expecting a shard, the 
tiniest crumb of sympathy. 
"It's no wonder. With a whore like your mother for a wife. He must have 
been too ashamed to stay." 
 
At the time, I didn’t know what a whore was but it didn’t matter because 
I didn’t care what she called my mother. I just wanted her not to stand 
outside my apartment when I walked home from school and embarrass 
me in front of my new friends. My new friends were Jewish. Their 
mothers played Mahjong and cooked potato latkes and noodle kugel with 
real raisins and cinnamon and one day would invite me, I could just tell, 
to their daughters’ Bat Mitzvahs. It was embarrassing enough to be the 
lone Catholic in a Jewish neighborhood. I didn’t need any loud-mouthed 
Italian woman standing with her snotty kid on my sidewalk interfering 
with my getting into the house fast so I could lose the uniform.  
What I had figured out already was how to play on sympathy. How early 
I learned that if you were good enough at the sympathy game, you could 
turn the tables and pretty soon people who complained about something 
you’d done would feel sorrier for you than they did for themselves.  
 
What sources, I wonder, did I consult in my self-education? Most 
certainly, The Lives of the Saints, those martyred afficionadoes of the 
sympathy game. The nuns told us to look to them for our models. But of 
what? With so many arrows and spikes and crowns of thorns 
circumscribing every delicate part of the body, what else was I supposed 
to think besides putting the greater glorification of self-abjection in the 
service of personal fame.  
 
Or maybe it was just all those Cagney movies I watched with Mom, the 
ones where some lousy rat of thief and murderer turns cowardly as he 
confronts the electric chair in the penultimate scene. You could feel the 
audience’s sympathy rising because, after all, he is the hero and what’s a 
little mayhem among friends. 
 
Such were the central texts in my youthful moral education. Years later, 
after I’d studied chapter and verse from most of the world’s major 
religions, I found nothing much new in any one of them. If you wanted 
dogma, the rules of engagement for the sympathy game, every system 
seemed to foreground the same thing—do this and this to win salvation, 
to get a better job, to find love, to save your marriage, your kids, the 
whole damned planet. Do this and you can forget about thinking. 
 
The Italian woman kept vigil and so Mom and I moved across Flatlands 
and into the bog of Canarsie, where we lived until I started high school 
and we rented a larger second floor apartment in a rambling Victorian in 
Crown Heights. We stayed there for two years until Mom married Jim 
and we moved back to Mill Basin and I lived with them until college 
and, after freshman year, married John. Meanwhile Dad met Caroline 
and made a new family with her and her children and for the next forty 
years lived in the tiny Shore Parkway apartment I occasionally visited 
where he was now dying. 
Such memories as these surfaced as I thought about Brooklyn. At the 
time it seemed to me perfectly ordinary that they did. After all, I told 
myself, I was going to visit my dying father. It was natural that the past, 
long sedimented, bubble up. The night I arrived at Dad’s apartment I 
jotted down a few notes and didn’t look at them again until many years 
later, when I started to think about Eichmann and remembered Arendt’s 
strange statement that what she had written allowed her to let go of her 
past. At the time, I couldn’t have imagined letting go to be possible. I 
was too busily devoted to dredging the past up, lock, stock and barrel, 
looking for any excuse, any reason at all to blame the artifacts for how 
awful they looked behind the exhibition glass in the museum. 
 
My father and I had a difficult relationship. At least that's what I thought 
for most of my life. As to what he thought, he never told me directly. 
And because he was the parent who left, he had the benefit of absence 
and a brand new family to make the power of his silence and my belief in 
his wisdom grow out of proportion. For many years after he left, I asked 
him more or less the same question. Why did that happen, Dad? Why did 
you leave? But the real question was—don’t you still love me?  
 
As I grew older, I devised more clever ways to test him. One Sunday, I 
waited until the last minute to take the bus from my end of Brooklyn to 
his, knowing I’d be at least an hour late for dinner. I thought that if he 
was at the door laughing and pointing to his watch, I was golden. But if 
he said nothing for an hour or more, I’d crossed the line and at exactly 
the right moment would admit my mistake mea culpa, mea culpa, mea 
maxima culpa, accept penance, genuflect and be returned to the fold. But 
when he opened the door all he said was how happy he was to see my 
son wearing that blue sweater Caroline made him and didn’t Jed want to 
go out for a ride on his new brand new red Schwinn bike. 
 
Years later, when I was in graduate school, I regaled Dad with quotations 
from Marx, convinced that the right turn of phrase would demonstrate 
my evident wisdom and uncanny ability, given that I’d grown up in a 
household without books, to have mastered some of the most difficult 
works of Western philosophy. He was impressed; you could just tell. But 
somehow I was certain that none of that mattered and devised the 
greatest test of all and asked my father to testify on my behalf in the 
battle with my first husband for custody of our son, Jed.  
 
Dad appeared every day for a week and when his turn came he took the 
stand and swore on a stack of bibles that his grandson Jed was better off 
living with me, his mother, and my boyfriend Mike than being moved 
and that, yes, he got to see him frequently enough, and, no, he didn’t see 
anything wrong with the relationship his daughter had with Mike or with 
how Mike treated Jed. By keeping what he really thought about Mike to 
himself I kept my son. But the truly amazing thing is that I didn’t see 
then what he had done.   
 
Only once, when we were arguing about politics and I mentioned Mike, 
did Dad break his silence on the subject. It was several years after the 
custody battle and I’d moved to Kentucky and married Mike. 
“That lousy bastard thinks he’s so smart, but he doesn’t know a thing, he 
isn’t worth even one hair on Caroline’s head,” he said, shaking his fist in 
my face. He’d never hit me as a child, but it felt like he wanted to now.  
“Edward, calm down,” Caroline said. “It’s not Kathleen’s fault.” 
“He thinks he’s too good for us. Where is he today? Again in the library? 
He makes me sick. He’s too good for us to come here? Well, we don’t 
need him. Even when he’s here all he does is sit in the corner and sulk.” 
“He’s depressed, Dad,” I said. “It’s depression, not arrogance.” 
 “He’s a lazy Jew bastard, not worth a hair on my wife’s head.”  
 
To use an American cultural metaphor for bigotry, my father would have 
made Archie Bunker look mild. Whenever I visited I steeled myself for 
the usual litany of racial slurs and commentary about lazy Blacks and 
sloppy Russians dirtying the neighborhood. And, of course, of course, 
the Jews. But the strange thing about my father was his heart wasn’t in it. 
When it came down to someone in particular, he recurred to the person. 
In the face of the individual he sacrificed the slur.  
He didn’t do it in some facile liberal way, as in “some of my best friends 
are…(fill in the minority blank)”. Dad was no liberal. Instead, he 
described the person in a story with fullness and grace, stressing in 
particular any acts of kindness performed.  
 
But he couldn’t go there in Mike’s case. 
“Dirty bastard,” he mumbled again and went back to his beer. I rose from 
the table and left the apartment. But in that half-conscious way you feel a 
troubling thought emerge in a far corner of your brain, I suspect I knew 
why my father was furious.  
 
Only much later did I see it wasn’t Mike’s being Jewish or even the fact 
that after we’d married I converted to Judaism myself. “Well, at least 
there’ll be some religion in the home,” my father quipped when I told 
him. Besides, he couldn’t protest too much; he’d abandoned Catholicism 
for his wife’s Lutheran beliefs, though, he was quick to point out, that 
switch wasn’t as loaded as mine. No, what provoked his rage was that 
courtroom. It had challenged my father’s sense of morality a little too 
close to the bone and deprived him of the occasion to say what he really 
thought. He had to stand in court and swear that everything was fine and 
we were so caught up in our own righteousness we didn’t stop even once 
stop to ask how the whole process made him feel. 
 
In those days I thought that one needed only the right logic and a few 
hardy facts to reach the correct conclusions about the egalitarian 
parameters of human dignity and mutual respect. I dismissed my father’s 
inability to forget the category and see Mike as a person as one of Dad’s 
many unacknowledged contradictions. Worse still, I considered my 
father thoughtless.  
 
There was such smugness in my judgment of him at the time because, of 
course, it hinged on my belief that I displayed no such moral weakness 
myself. It would be a long time before I tested my own prejudices and 
confronted the difficult questions Arendt raised in Eichmann. “Could the 
activity of thinking as such, the habit of examining whatever happens to 
come to pass or attract attention, regardless of results and specific 
contents, could this activity be among the conditions that make men 
abstain from evil-doing or even actually `condition’ them against it?” It 
would be a long time before I separated thinking from ideology. 
 
But now my father was dying and I went to Brooklyn swimming in 
memories. One late afternoon I sat vigil at my father’s deathbed, 
watching his eyes flutter open then close. I was thinking about all the 
time and distance between us. He turned toward me and asked, as easily 
as if he were asking for a sip of water, if I would change his bedclothes. I 
stood up and put my arm around his back, raising him enough to take off 
his pajama shirt. It occurred to me he must have done the same for me 
when I was a child. Removing his thin cloth pants, I slid my arm 
underneath his knees to lift his bony legs high, as I had done to my sons 
when they were small, and took the soiled diaper from below his 
buttocks, replacing it with a clean one, gently closing the top of it over 
his pelvis, sealing its edges above his fragile hips. His hips formed a 
perfect frame around his hollowed belly so that the whole of his lower 
torso took on the appearance of a porcelain bowl, transforming the tumor 
protruding from his center into a pale pear, as if it were some calcified 
delicacy encased in my father’s translucent skin. As to the rest, I 
pretended to see nothing. Not the penis, not the grayed groin hair, not the 
feces, not the urine stained clothes.  
 
At that moment I began to feel the father let his daughter go and as he let 
her go she let her anger at him for being the father who left and her anger 
at herself for being the never-good-enough daughter join and surface in 
the room and the father took it into his delirium describing snapshots 
from his youth he saw projected on the wall in front of him and for some 
moments he became a child again, made the eldest by the unexpected 
death of his older brother, watching his own father working the Brooklyn 
docks and there, there, look, they were carrying sides of meat onto trucks 
and it was good stuff didn’t you want some and I said sure because when 
the father parted company with the man I was only Kathy watching 
Edward Jones dying in the bed. 
 
I let Edward go and buried him and thought I put my daughterhood to 
rest. I stopped reading Eichmann.  Except daughterhood isn't so easily 
put to rest. Neither is Eichmann.  
 
A month after my father’s death, a student of mine was murdered by her 
boyfriend. She had been a strong woman, a self-defense instructor, 
director of the campus women’s center. They’d met at the gym in the 
community college where they both had been students before moving to 
San Diego. He dropped out of school soon after they arrived. They had a 
difficult relationship. She wasn’t afraid. Sometimes when they fought, 
her friends said, they pushed each other around. He began to do drugs; 
she figured she’d straighten him out and approached it like any other 
project. She told him to get his act together, tried humiliating him with 
his own failures. Then she threatened to leave. A few weeks later, after a 
crack binge, he strangled her and tried to make it look like someone else 
did it. He confessed a week after he was arrested. 
 
That summer, when the trial began, I picked up Eichmann again. “It 
would have been so much more comforting to believe Eichmann was a 
monster.” What did Arendt mean by that? I wondered. Was I looking for 
a monster?  
 
One day the killer took a seat in the witness stand. I remember thinking 
how handsome he was. Raising his large hands to form a circle in the 
empty air in front of him he described how he put his hands around his 
girlfriend’s throat and then repeated the action. Had he remembered 
she’d said something? Oh, yes; she had. He remembered. “You’re 
hurting me.” That’s what she had said.  
 
I tried hard but still couldn’t see any monster. Instead images of things 
I’d read about or remembered from my own life floated before me. And I 
suddenly felt I had once been at the scene of a crime, witnessed 
atrocities, helped hide evidence, and otherwise acted normal. Because I, 
too, had once been a victim of violence and had lived to tell the story, I 
understood why I wanted the monsters. What a consolation they were; 
what a simple, elegant way not to see how easily anyone can overcome 
the repugnance to do something awful. 
Maybe we corral the familiar because it’s all we really know. But I’ve 
come to think that knowing is not enough and that’s a strange place for 
an intellectual to be. It means having to throw out all the formulae and 
comforting slogans and try all over again to figure out how, as Arendt 
used to say, to think what you are doing without a banister to guide you.  
 
When I was a child I used to play a game. I’d lie down in the middle of 
the living room rug and stare at the ceiling. As I stared I felt my 
perspective shifting, the world turning upside down and me floating, 
suspended, above everything. Below me everything was empty and quiet. 
That’s how it felt reading Eichmann after my father died, after the 
student was murdered, and memories of childhood and its reiterations 
surfaced. The world turned upside down and became empty and quiet. I 
was losing sight of the monsters and beginning to see how much harder it 
was living without them.  
 
At the end of the murder trial, the jury convicted the young man in the 
death of my student. One October night two months later he hanged 
himself in prison and left a note for his attorney. Tell my mother I loved 
her; tell her I’m sorry. Perhaps, I thought, he had become a monster to 
himself. 
 
Everything looked different when I finished Eichmann. I began to sense 
what Hannah Arendt might have meant by feeling light-hearted. It wasn’t 
gaiety but a lightness, a kind of roominess of heart felt at the moment of 
releasing the demons. Still I wasn’t certain she’d been completely honest. 
Because in place of the monsters I had a feeling she’d put something 
more frightening. By banishing the monsters she’d brought back into the 
world the strange, monstrous burden of freedom. 
 
What I got from Eichmann was Arendt’s refusal to accept righteousness 
as anyone’s prerogative and this has been perhaps the most difficult 
lesson to learn. For many years, I believed it self-evident why one must 
feel indignant at the sight of injustice and aligned myself, rather 
cavalierly and arrogantly, on the side of the struggle against it. I thought 
the moral response to condemn all social and political iniquities 
committed against life’s hapless victims in the name of justice was 
autonomic. I discovered how to play an advanced form of the sympathy 
game. What I hadn’t counted on was learning that perhaps I wound up on 
the moral side more by accident than self-conscious design. 
 
All the ruminations triggered by reading Eichmann at this time in my life 
had brought me to this—I could have been Eichmann. I thought this not 
because I saw parallels between my life and his, indicating shared causal 
factors that could be used to predict which humans will do awful, even 
horrific, things to which others. No, it was the absence of parallels, the 
uniquely ordinary tale Arendt wove out of the facts of Eichmann’s life 
that got me to think and I began to see I could no longer be certain I’d 
know what the right thing to do was and just do it.  
 
Believe me, I tried to find an easier exit from this story. At first, I 
thought, of course, I never would have perpetrated such atrocities. Then I 
found myself wishing that if I had lived in the1930s and 40s, I would 
have been Danish or maybe Italian. But if I absolutely had to be German, 
then, angel of mercy, let me have been Sergeant Anton Schmidt.  
 
Schmidt had been in charge of a German patrol in Poland and his job was 
to collect stray soldiers and return them to their units. In the course of his 
regular duties he befriended members of the Jewish underground and, 
without any financial motive, began supplying forged papers and trucks 
in which Jews escaped. For five months he persisted, until he was 
arrested and executed in 1942. I wanted to believe I’d have been Anton 
Schmidt. But, the thing is, I couldn’t be sure.  
 
I couldn’t be sure that if they asked me for the names of neighbors, I 
wouldn’t cooperate to protect my job, my family, myself, or if they asked 
me to prove my Aryan descent I wouldn’t get out the appropriate 
pedigree. There was no certainty I wouldn’t have acted like the other 
women soldiers in Abu Ghraib. And even if they invited me to head a 
project that would ensure the greater glory of nation and bring honor to 
the highest powers that I wouldn’t have advanced to the highest level of 
the sympathy game and say I’d done it because after so many 
disappointments in a vale of misfortune I finally got the chance to do 
something I was called on to do and therefore was not guilty in the sense 
of the indictment. 
 
There are so many like Eichmann who exist not because of where or of 
whom they were born or because of what gods they worship or some 
other predictable circumstance or observable cultural pattern and 
certainly not because there’s a little Eichmann in everyone. They exist 
because the world has changed all around us and we haven’t been paying 
attention.  
 
There are too many people not thinking, too many not telling Anton 
Schmidt and Zindel Grynszpan and Miriam Akavia and Charlotte Delbo 
and Monique Mujawamariya and Meena and all aunt Hagar’s other 
children’s stories. Because without thought and without story, how can 
we even hope to defeat the man in the glass booth? 
 
Hope lies behind that question and the answer stares me right in the face. 
After the monsters are gone, only you and I are left.  
 
I don’t know about you, but that makes me feel light-hearted.  
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